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Private management and governance styles in a Japanese public hospital: A story of 
West meets East 
1.0 Introduction 
Healthcare reforms relating to governance and management have been widely undertaken by 
governments worldwide (Mattei et al., 2013). The major aims of the healthcare reforms 
driven by New Public Management (NPM) ideals rested on productivity but arguing for 
equity and quality (Martinussen and Magnussen, 2011; Maupin, 2009; Zhou et al., 2014). 
These claims have been scrutinised by researchers predominantly in Western countries (Dan 
and Pollitt, 2014). Previous studies have attempted to understand the health care reforms 
from macro perspectives such as the role of the state (Fredriksson and Winblad, 2008); 
engagements of NGOs (Maupin, 2009); an outcome of hegemonic struggles (Filc, 2014); and 
the introduction of neo-liberal ideology (Walker, 2017). Micro processes such as managerial 
accountability, performance management, the role of key actors have also been examined 
(Ferlie et al., 2016). Nevertheless, very few have engaged in deeper analysis of how 
underlying institutional and cultural conditions constrain or enable key actors in shaping 
healthcare governance mechanisms at the organizational level. We believe that such analysis 
will provide deeper explanations of why reforms such as healthcare governance often 
produce a variety of unanticipated consequences. 
Healthcare governance reforms in Asian countries have been limited. Japanese healthcare 
reforms are of particular interest, as debate about healthcare costs has been high on the 
agenda of recent Japanese governments (Otaki, 2017). This debate has been directed partly 
toward the medical insurance system, which has led to overuse of tests and drugs, 
affordability gap increased between rich and poor, unconstrained demand from patients, 
spiralling costs and imbalanced geographical distributions of healthcare service providers 
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(Nomura and Ishikawa, 2005; Watanabe and Hashimoto, 2012). It has also been directed 
toward the recruitment politics in local public hospitals (Takaku and Bessho, 2018). 
Nevertheless, academic research on healthcare governance reforms in Japan is scarce.  
The existing literature calls for country-specific analysis of NPM implementations to build a 
better understanding of the dynamics of underlying conditions that lead to success or crisis 
(Reiter and Klenk, 2018). Responding to this call, we examine healthcare governance and its 
implementation in the historical, institutional and cultural context of Japan. In particular, we 
examine the role of key actors, and specifically physicians, in accepting, adapting or rejecting 
healthcare reforms at the organizational level.  
The next sections provide a brief review of healthcare reforms, and present the cultural 
political economy of health care reforms and research methods employed in this study. 
Empirical findings are then presented. The paper finishes with a discussion and some 
concluding remarks. 
2.0 Healthcare governance reforms and Medical Professionals 
The role of medical professionals including physicians in healthcare is crucial and has been 
studied extensively (Smith et al., 2016). They are viewed as facilitators and key change 
agents in health care (Collyer et al., 2017; Lockett et al., 2012). The role of healthcare 
professionals in NPM driven reforms has also been studied (Dahan, 2015; Turner et al., 
2016). Andersen’s (2009) study of Danish GPs, surgeons and dentists reveals that healthcare 
professionals’ values often outweigh NPM-driven financial incentives. Turner et al. (2016) 
find that healthcare professionals, and especially frontline managers in NHS England, are 
more resistant to reforms owing to their autonomous, highly creative and enduring 
professional associations. Similarly, doctoral training in France has been found to exhibit 
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strong professional autonomy and values that create inflammatory discourses and tensions 
between healthcare professionals and academics (Dahan, 2015).  
Accountability and governance in healthcare is one of the key aspects of reforms reflected in 
previous studies (Pérez Durán, 2016; Greer et al., 2014). Various consequences of these 
reforms have been reported (Simonet, 2016; Mattei et al., 2013). Simonet (2016) argues that 
the strong presence of an ‘elite’ civil service diverts accountability toward managers rather 
than the public. Similarly, Mattei et al. (2013) report that, in Germany, Norway and 
Denmark, as a consequence of reforms to hospital funding motivated by the corporatization 
and professionalization agenda, hospital managers find themselves in an ever-increasing web 
of accountability to bureaucrats in various layers of government.  
However, how do the healthcare professionals such as physicians respond to reforms is not 
well researched. Such research is important, as NPM reforms spread progressively into the 
conduct of actors and associated governing structures (Osipovič et al., 2016; Van de 
Bovenkamp et al., 2014). Any form of healthcare reforms requires, Martinussen and 
Magnussen (2011) argues, due considerations of key actors’ embeddedness in historical, 
cultural and institutional conditions. Thus, building on studies of healthcare professionals’ 
accountability and governance, we examine the role of healthcare professionals such as 
physicians in diverting, accepting or resisting healthcare governance reforms in hospitals. 
Adopting a cultural political economy (CPE) approach, we interrogate how institutional, 
historical and cultural values shape healthcare professionals’ responses to reforms.  
3.0 Japanese healthcare reforms 
Since the 1980s, Japan has faced increasing healthcare spending and growing regional 
disparities in access to healthcare. In the 1990s, the average rate of real growth in Japan’s 
total healthcare expenditure started to exceed the rate of real GDP growth. Economic 
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pressures, an aging population and rising costs led to a call for radical reforms (Hashimoto et 
al., 2011). One focus of the reforms has been the healthcare delivery system, especially 
public hospitals. 
Two government ministries, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) and the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIAC) have been involved in the 
healthcare reforms. The MHLW has initiated most reforms, ranging from redeploying 
hospital bed functions from acute to long-term care stages, to implementing home care, 
maintaining quality of care and establishing future regional medical plans. On the other hand, 
the MIAC has been involved only with public hospitals and their reform, mainly because 
public hospitals are owned by local governments, which in turn are supervised by the MIAC. 
In this paper, we focus mainly on local public hospitals, as they are one of the main providers 
of critical care serving approximately 64% of infectious disease beds, and 34% of 
tuberculosis beds whilst only accounting for approximately 14% of the total hospital beds 
(MHLW, 2017).  
A major reform was brought in by the MIAC in late 2007 in the context of increased outlays 
and huge debts of local public hospitals. The latter have been targeted mainly because more 
than three-quarters of public hospitals operate at a loss (The Economist, 2011). 
Comprehensive measures aimed not only at enhancing fiscal soundness, but also at 
improving hospitals’ governance and accountability. Local governments were asked to take 
measures such as corporatization of public hospitals, followed by a review of governance and 
management mechanisms; regular performance reporting on occupancy rates, the ratio of 
ordinary revenues and remuneration to expenditure; and concentrating beds in well-
functioning ‘magnet hospitals’ and building ‘satellite clinics’ to safeguard healthcare services 
in rural areas. Local public hospitals with occupancy rates of less than 70 per cent in the last 
three years were also expected to reduce their number of beds or be replaced by clinics. 
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Financial incentives were introduced to encourage local governments to be fully engaged in 
the reforms.  
Within a year, by 2008, 22 local public hospitals had been transferred from local 
governments to independent local administrative corporations (Zhang and Oyama, 2016). 
This was supposed to allow them to be more independent and financially solvent. However, 
only 10 per cent of local public hospitals were generating surplus according to the survey 
conducted by MIAC. These reforms began to filter into all local hospitals, including our case 
study which was formed as a corporation in 2013. A second wave of reforms began in 2015. 
These were formulated on the basis of NPM ideals as before, but gave more specific 
directions to local governments. The reforms were to focus on private style governance 
assuming this will lead to cost management efficiency, reduction in deficit and increasing 
engagement with citizens. We aim to understand how the new set of governance reforms has 
played out in the new hospital. 
4.0 Cultural political economy of medical education and physicians in Japan 
We conceive the healthcare system is a socio-cultural system. Cultural constructions of health 
and illness is not new. Medical anthropologists through the lens of ethnography have been 
studying culture and illness and healthcare since 1950s and 1960s (Good et al., 2010; 
Kleinman, 1995). Since then a plethora of studies dealing with health, illness, life and death 
in deeply rooted cultural contexts such as Crandon-Malamud’s work (1991) on viewing 
medicine as social idiom, Frankel’s work (1986) on Huli’s response to illness and other 
works (see for details, Scheper-Hughes, 1992; Good, 1994; Young, 1995). Similarly, the 
study of health and illness in Japan has also been studied thoroughly inspired by notions of 
‘meta-medical’ and ‘medical plularism’ (Worsely, 1982; Ohnuki-Tierney, 1984). Seminal 
works by Lock (1993) and Ohnuki-Tierney’s work (1984) have been invaluable in laying the 
groundwork for a culturally informed analysis of heath and illness in Japanese context.  
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Inspired by these works and extending this to the domain of policy but building on previous 
studies in health governance literature (Osipovič et al., 2016), we believe CPE as a 
methodological approach would be useful to provide a point of departure for an analysis of 
health care reforms in Modern Japan. This approach considers the cultural turn (meaning-
making) to the analysis of the articulation between the economic and the political and their 
embedding in broader sets of social relations (p. 336, Jessop, 2010). The meaning-making, in 
turn, is shaped by neural, cognitive, and semiotic frames as well as social interaction and 
meaning-making technologies (Jessop, 2010). Jessop (2010) refers meaning-making to 
semiosis which is more than the intersubjective production of meaning but also an important 
element of ‘the social’. Following the CPE tradition, we consider both extra semiotic 
(historical and institutional conditions) features of health care in Japan and semiotic (cultural 
norms and values) features, and the interactions of social actors in assessing the limits of 
NPM style governance in Japanese healthcare. This will provide us a broader understanding 
of the role of healthcare professionals in resisting, adopting and adapting a particular reform 
agenda. Our aim here is not to develop a particular model but explore how social actors 
interact with the new economic imaginary (such as NPM governance) in the given context of 
institutions and cultural conditioning. Thus, an examination of socio-cultural health system 
including the medical education and profession, Japanese cultural values and ideologies is 
apt.  
The Japanese medical education system was compared to the Galapagos Islands for its 
unusual and singular evolution (Kuwabara et al., 2015). During the Meiji period (1868-1912), 
Japan began to move from the Chinese traditional to the Western medical system influenced 
by the visits of medical professors from the German Military from 1871. The extent of 
German Military Medical unit’ influence on Japanese medical education can still be seen 
today (Nakagawa, 1993).  
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After graduation from university, medical graduates were traditionally enrolled into the 
trainee programme called ikyoku (literal translation is work place) (Otaki, 1998). The ikyoku 
is extremely important for understanding the power of medical professors and schools. In the 
Ikyoku system, the professor is at the top of the hierarchal totem pole often make many career 
decisions for the trainees (p.101, Kuwabara, 2015). It works as a specialist training 
programme as well as an employment agency/internal labour market benefiting its members. 
This is consistent with ancient medical tradition in Japan, whereby the teachers used to send 
students (physicians) to specific communities on the basis of the latter’s needs. Now hospitals, 
especially hospitals in small cities and rural areas send requests to multiple ikyoku systems to 
recruit physicians.  
In 2004, the New Postgraduate Medical Education Programme (NPGME) was introduced to 
bypass the ikyoku system of training (Iizuka and Watanabe, 2016; Kuwabara et al., 2015). 
Consequently, the professors at the university hospitals lost control over entry-level 
physicians but still attract 45.2% of the total new trainees to the ikyoku sysem (Kuwabara et 
al. 2015). However, the power of ikyoku system, though waning, remain significant as trained 
physicians find it advantageous to join the ikyoku system for specialist training, career 
choices and referrals (Iizuka and Watanable, 2016). MHLW’s recent surveys on all newly 
trained physicians revealed that most of the physicians wishes to join the Ikyoku - 80.6% in 
2018 and 85.9% in 2017 (MHLW, 2018). 
The power of the medical schools and physicians must also be understood in relation to the 
respect held by physicians in Japanese society (Davies and Ikeno, 2002; Sunda, 2015). 
Commentators argue that their methods and mistakes are barely questioned – they are, after 
all, sensei, a title of respect used for teachers, academics and others who are looked to for 
guidance (Watts, 2000). This was reflected in the patient-doctor relationship even in the 
recent past as Ohnuki-Tierney, (1984) argues: ‘in Japanese doctor-patient relationship, 
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patients place the entire responsibility for their wellbeing in the doctor’s hands, giving in 
turn a deep sense of trust, especially in the case of serious illness’ (p.177). Nevertheless, in 
modern Japan, the physicians are now forced to provide explanations to patients due to 
patients’ education and rights among other factors. Increasingly, patients seek second 
opinions and rankings before choosing physicians. Studies have also showed Japanese 
physicians are losing trusts from patients (Murata and Aramaki, 2014), yet they still enjoy a 
revered status.  
The above historical and institutional conditions of the medical profession and physicians 
need to be understood in conjunction with Japanese cultural norms (semiotic) where the 
social actors operate. We draw heavily on Nakane’s (1970) work, as well as on other studies 
of Japanese culture (Davies and Ikeno, 2002; Jun and Muto, 1995) to make sense of how 
ingrained cultural orientations defeat the purpose of NPM styles of reform in public hospitals. 
Some of the cultural norms such as group consciousness and wa (harmony or oneness), 
senpai–kōhai (senior-junior) relations, and seken (common interest group or informal 
personal relationship in workplace) are significant especially in organizational contexts. 
These three are interrelated and complementary.  
Maintaining wa or oneness is the most important element of Japanese society. Maintaining 
silence (chinmoku) helps to preserve harmony in groups and public meetings. Losing face is 
inconceivable and deters members from opening up. Tatemae (façade) is used to maintain 
this harmony and create a comfortable atmoshphere. Honne (true sound) is applied in one 
own’s space, whereas tatemae is used in more public forums. Skillful players use it without 
even realizing it. This goes against the notion of seeking accounts from the accountable, and 
especially the powerful. Hierarchy or vertical relationship is important for group coherence 
and survival (Nakane, 1970, p. 39).  
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In vertical group formation, senpai–kōhai (senior–junior) relationships are crucial. The rules 
of superiority between a senpai and a kōhai are analogous to a teacher–student relationship, 
in which the age and experience of the teacher must be respected and never questioned 
(Davies and Ikeno, 2002). The ikyoku system is embedded in the senpai–kōhai relationship. 
Although these relationships have not been strictly observed in recent times, they remain 
strong in Japanese minds (Davies and Ikeno, 2002). These vertical relationships last for life, 
emphasizing respect for authority and chains of command. This is clearly visible in meetings, 
as employees are rarely willing to express opinions without prior consent from their seniors. 
Challenges in meetings are rare and has negative consequences (McVeigh, 2015). This is also 
connected to the notion of being in seken which means that all members of the group should 
act cohesively, so seken will purge individual differences to impose wa. This is not as strong 
as before as Kokami (2009) refers to this loosely coupled seken as ‘kuki’ (mood of 
surroundings). Whatever, it still contributes to maintaining wa (harmony) within the group. In 
summary, a deeply-embedded Japanese consciousness of vertical relationships and oneness 
or wa has serious implications for governance and accountability mechanisms in Japanese 
organizations.  
5.0 Research methods 
Following the research tradition of a CPE approach, we not only wished to draw on historical 
literature and previous studies to understand the structural conditions (material/historical and 
cultural) affecting agents’ (key stakeholders) actions but also sought to trace these structural 
conditions from actors’ own accounts. Thus, this research employed data triangulation 
conducting documentary research, observations and semi-structured interviews following the 
ethical approval guidelines of University of Shizuoka. Data for this case study were collected 
in 2018 over a period of six months.  
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Important data sources for identifying societal and cultural conditions included a preliminary 
review of the historical literature on the medical profession and hospitals, as well as broader 
politico-economic and historical literature. As a next step, in order to develop a better 
understanding of the structural conditions faced by key actors in two city councils, we 
collected annual statements, official documents and minutes of meetings relating to the 
hospital. One of the authors attended some governance meetings. This provided a deeper 
insight into intricate relationships between board members and the hospital authority. 
To supplement the observational and documentary evidence, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted. This was one of most important sources of data, contributing to an understanding 
of how key actors shape the hospital’s governance mechanisms. Two authors (one native 
speaker) were involved in facilitating the interviews. One had been an advisor to the city 
council, and his contacts were useful in gaining access to these key interviewees. 
Using one of the author’s knowledge about the key stakeholders of hospital’s governance 
mechanisms and health sector, we interviewed 28 individuals in total, and contacted them 
again to ask follow-up questions where necessary. Our interviewees included one community 
leader, one current and two retired city council officials, Mayor of the city council, one 
assembly member of the city, the CEO/Director of the hospital, the Deputy Director of the 
hospital, Head of nursing, two hospital officials, ex CEO of an old hospital, one academic 
(advisory committee member), one ministry official and the physicians (13) working in the 
case hospital, clinics and university hospitals in the region. We also engaged in email 
correspondence with the hospital’s CEO and other interviewees. We fully explained the 
projects and assured the interviewees of their anonymity before setting up the meetings. 
The interviews were conducted mainly in Japanese, but translated immediately into English 
so that the non-Japanese author could follow them. Most interviews lasted around 60-120 
minutes and were digitally recorded. These were later transcribed by one of the co-authors. 
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Various issues were discussed during the interviews, including the context of healthcare and 
the social status of medical physicians; Ikyoku system, control of the hospital by two central 
government ministries; accountability and levels of participation by citizens and politicians; 
the governance and management structure of public hospitals; and financial conditions pre- 
and post-merger, and the hospital’s cost control and management. 
At the end of each interview, we shared with respondents our understanding of what they had 
said during the interview to provide them with an opportunity to endorse or amend anything 
that they had said. These interviews were further corroborated and complemented especially 
by documentary evidence collected throughout the period. One of the authors had access to 
city council board meetings, observations and minutes of the meetings provided a great 
insight into the perceptions, intentions, and actions of the Mayors and Physician-cum-CEO of 
the hospital and other key actors. Thus, three sources of evidence (data triangulations) 
complemented each other to make sure we receive reasonable accounts of governance 
mechanisms.  
After the collection of data, the next stage was the analysis. This analysis took two forms: 
one that led to uncovering the historical and cultural conditions and another that involved the 
key actors’ strategies and actions. First, for understanding/interpreting the historical and 
cultural conditions, we drew on our knowledge of the historical and institutional context of 
Japanese society, as well as cultural values such as senpai–kōhai relationships and 
maintaining wa and seken. The second line of analysis involved the identification of key 
actors’ interpretations of these institutional conditions and their strategies. In this line of 
analysis, we developed codes (manually) that captured the contextualized interpretations of 
agents and their actions (Mason, 2002; Miles and Huberman, 1994, p.56). Our data analysis 
helped us understand the differences between intended and actual governance structure. 
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Our final analysis involved converting all data relating to contextual conditions and agents’ 
actions into a deeper and more meaningful theoretical narrative (Miles and Huberman, 1994, 
p.91). In order to do this, we developed a coding scheme that would capture the empirics of 
the case study (Mason, 2002; Miles and Huberman, 1994, p56). While developing this coding 
scheme, we had to keep in mind the broad theoretical framework, i.e., historical conditions of 
healthcare and cultural norms of Japanese society. 
For this purpose, we used a coding scheme borrowed from Strauss (1987). According to 
Strauss (1987), a researcher should start with a coding scheme that differentiates between 
‘conditions’, ‘interactions among actors’, ‘strategies’, and ‘outcomes’. The benefit of this 
coding scheme is that it fits in very neatly with the tenets of CPE, which analytically 
categorise the flow of social action into structural conditions and agents’ actions that cause 
outcomes. The next two codes, i.e., ‘(inter)action amongst actors’ and ‘strategies’ helped us 
see different strategies and actions of agents in the context of intended governance 
framework. The last coding scheme, i.e., outcomes, would capture the consequences such as 
the actual form of governance structure. As we analysed the data, we constantly reworked our 
coding scheme to capture the nuances of the data and to understand the process of conditions, 
(re)actions, strategies, and outcomes. For example, during our data analysis, we realised that 
the condition such as ikyoku is both constraining and enabling the recruitments of physicians. 
As a final step, we re-checked the consistency between the data sources, the data codes, and 
the implications we had drawn.  
6.0 Case study: New hospital 
Our case – new hospital came into existence in 2013 as a result of a merger of two old 
hospitals managed by two different city councils (local government units). Both hospitals 
were running below capacity, and at times below 70 per cent occupancy triggering the MIAC 
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and the city councils to adopt remedial measures. The new 500-bed hospital began to operate 
in 2013 replacing the old hospitals funded by the city councils issuing public bonds.  
6.1 Governance structure 
The new hospital’s governance structure was conceived as a private-corporation style of 
governance, as expected by the NPM ideals taken up the MIAC following the 2008 and 2015 
reforms. The underlying idea was that both councils would stay away from running the 
hospital, and there would be a corporate board to oversee operations. The intended/ideal form 
of governance is presented in Figure 1. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
The structure presented in Figure 1 was conceived in the spirit of NPM. The Mayors – key 
stakeholders - (in this case, two mayors from two cities), though not involved in the corporate 
board, has the right to appoint and remove the president/CEO. The president was the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) of the hospital and supposed to be responsible for strategic matters 
(clinical and non-clinical), and the COO (chief operations officer – Incho) was to run the 
hospital day-to-day, focusing only on clinical matters.  
It was conceived that citizen were the primary shareholders. Like a private corporation, they 
were accountable to shareholders. The president/CEO was supposed to directly report 
managerial and business conditions to the citizens. However, it was not exactly specified how 
this should be done.  
The corporate board – seen as a representative of stakeholders/shareholders - was formed for 
the hospital also known as a corporate assembly. It was formed, with five assembly members 
from each city. The president was to report to the board twice per year. The board was 
expected to interrogate the president/CEO on strategic matters and budgets. The president 
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was also needed the board to approve the budget. The hospital was also supposed to be 
audited and approved by the board. 
In addition to the corporate board, an advisory committee was also formed to provide support 
to the president, consisting of two assembly members from each city, the mayors, one 
academic, and two physician representatives from the regional physicians’ association. The 
advisory committee was to meet twice per year. The function of this committee was 
conceived as advisory (not mandatory) but an important committee as it involved wider 
stakeholders and the two Mayors. The Mayors saw the committee as a vehicle to pass on the 
concerns of citizen and other strategic matters to the President/CEO.  
Nevertheless, the above governance was never operational in its exact/idealised form. As we 
gleaned from the interviews, observations and documentation, the actual form of governance 
structure is different in both form and spirit (see Figure 2). 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Accountability to citizen is non-existent, COO and President posts are merged, the influence 
of the corporate board and advisory committee on hospital management is weak. These are 
discussed below. 
First, the power of appointments and removal of top executives of the hospitals by two 
Mayors are severely curbed in reality. The top executive of the hospital must be the 
physicians or dentists (Medical Service Act, Article 46-6). One comment was that ‘it is partly 
because of the respect and the status that physicians have in Japanese society’. It is partly 
because of the ikyoku system where the physician cum CEOs have much more clout to attract 
and appoint other physicians in Hospitals. The challenge for the Mayors is experienced 
physicians are not readily available to work in smaller city hospitals such as our case study.  
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Thus, Mayors had to participate in a labour market governed by the ikyoku system. This is 
also because as one interviewee suggested that ‘a high-level appointment in the hospital is an 
important signal of the regional ikyoku system and the medical schools’. One physician 
commented on the clout of the head of the ikyoku system: Recruitment depends on the chief 
professor. Orders from the chief cannot be refused. All personnel replacement of Ikyoku 
members are under his control. Recently one doctor wanted to move to a larger hospital, but 
he was ordered to go to different hospitals which he finally had to accept it. The ikyoku 
system, in particular, is influential when it comes to the smaller hospital. The interviews with 
physicians revealed that smaller hospitals such as our case hospital are not especially a 
lucrative destination. Exploiting traditional cultural values senpai–kōhai relationship, 
heads/professors of the ikyoku in the medical school encourage physicians to join the 
hospital. This is also backed up by the better compensation packages than the other big city 
hospitals reflected in our interviews and previous studies (Iizuka and Watanabe, 2016). 
The consequence of the power of the ikyoku system and medical schools puts city council 
mayors in a precarious position when it comes to appointing or removing public hospital 
chiefs. This was no different in our case. For instance, the first COO was not keen on 
someone else supervising him, so he took over the post of president (first president/CEO) as 
well. Thus, the first president covered not only strategic matters but also daily matters. The 
mayors had to agree. The removal of the first president is a good example of how difficult for 
Mayors to deal with the powerful physicians rested on ikyoku but exacerbated by a lack of 
physicians. According to law, the mayors have the authority to hire and fire the president. 
Interestingly, rather than firing the president directly, they adopted an indirect process by 
going back to the same the medical school and asked his senpai (who recommended him at 
the first place!) to persuade him to resign, which he did in 2017. At the same time, the senpai 
promised to send the next candidate, who is now the hospital’s CEO. The current (recently 
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recruited) head of the hospital identifies himself as CEO (President’s Job) and Director 
(doing the COO’s job) continuing the similar structure. The concentration of power has 
continued even though the titles of the posts have changed.  
Second, formal accountability to citizens is lacking. The hospital currently engages with 
citizens in two ways. One is through feedback boxes placed in hospitals, and the other is 
through physicians’ attendance at meetings organized by an NGO to meet with citizens. Our 
interviews with hospital employees and the CEO indicate that this is not a critical part of their 
activities. The CEO revealed: ‘No. I do not meet with the patients’ group directly. I do not 
have a formal way to get their opinions, but we put an opinions box in our hospital. And we 
set up several lectures for citizens, we hear requests in Q&A sessions.’ This was corroborated 
by senior managers: ‘Almost no chance [to get feedback from stakeholders such as citizens 
and the local community]. One hospital administrator commented ‘citizen and patients only 
complain to the assembly members but not to the hospitals or physicians.’ This is confirmed 
by other interviewees including assembly members.  
We discovered that since 2009, before its establishment of the new hospital, the old hospitals 
have been publishing a glossy brochure for patients and citizens monthly. This has continued 
under the new Hospital. Nevertheless, there have not been any form of substantial dialogue 
between patients and citizen with the hospital. The ex-chief of an old hospital reflected: 
physicians are sent by the ikyoku, so their primary obligations to the ikyoku not to the 
hospital! There have no strong incentives for them engage with the citizen. Hospital 
administrator candidly commented: engagements with patients are very superficial but in fact 
these kinds of activities will be unattractive to physicians. Lack of accountability to external 
constituents is unsurprising, as the Japanese healthcare system has been constantly criticized 
for its lack of quality assurance systems (Arai and Ikegami, 1997).  
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Third, the board (corporate assembly) is unable to hold the hospital management to account. 
The president/CEO report to the corporate assembly twice per year to give an account of the 
hospital. Our interviews with corporate assembly members and published minutes of 
meetings indicate that these meetings have turned into monologues. Audit reports are 
submitted to this meeting for discussions and approval. Usually no questions asked about the 
reports with one exception in 2014. There were heated exchanges between the corporate 
assembly members and the then president at the second meeting on 20 August 2014. The 
meeting began with introductory comments from the president, followed by the 
administrator’s presentation of financial data and the auditors’ comments. A question and 
answer session then began. One exchange (extracted and translated from published minutes) 
went as follows: 
An assembly member: I am very concerned about the payroll cost. According to the reforms 
of MIAC, the payroll cost should be 50 per cent of your revenue. At the moment, it 
consumes 63.4 per cent of your revenue. According to your plan it remains over 50 per 
cent even 10 years down the line. How do you plan to control this cost? 
President: You have absolutely no logic in your argument. This is a nonsensical argument. 
You said the payroll ratio is 65 per cent, but after August it goes down to 56 per cent as 
patient numbers increase. So you talk about revenue; we need to walk first before we run. 
The president continued angrily: 
President: Do you remember what this project is? We open a new hospital and run it 
properly. If we save money on hiring, nobody will join the hospital. The crucial thing is 
we must recruit physicians, nurses, staff to run our hospital properly. So stop these 
financial matters now. We should talk about financial matters three, four years later. I 
said we struggle to run this hospital. We do. I have never seen this kind of hospital, I 
must emphasize. You should understand this. We have not done nothing. We have fully 
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engaged with all our duties. … Your logic is only for normal situations. Your logic is 
nonsense. That’s all from me. 
Administrator: As the president said, this year is a special year as we have just started. This 
first financial data should be compared with other good hospitals at the same stage. The 
comparison is not like with like. 
President: As I said before, I want you to understand our effort. We are doing everything we 
can. We have emphasized hiring staff in the first year. Then this year, we are trying to 
improve the quality of care and managerial matters in this second year. So, based on this 
first-year conclusion, do not complain at all. That is all. 
The assembly member responded defensively: 
Assembly member: This is the corporate assembly. We can discuss freely and I do not 
intend to criticize you. I took part in this merger process. This is special for me. I 
understand the first year is very hard … So, I intended to ask about your orientation for 
the following years. If you say my question is nonsense, I need to ask what is our 
assembly role? I note that your plan is for it to be 56 per cent of total income in future. 
Our examination of the minutes of subsequent meetings suggests that there have been no 
discussions or dialogue in any meetings held since, even under the new CEO. This has been a 
one-way process. The hospital administrators present their information to corporate assembly 
members, and the assembly accepts the budgetary statements with little or no discussion (see 
Figure 3 - an example of monologue).  
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
This is similar to Arai and Ikegami’s (1997) finding that physicians are simply unaccustomed 
to outside criticism, no matter how well-intended. The role of corporate board – voices of the 
city councils – is clearly overpowered by the Physicians.  
Fourth, the role of the advisory committee is superficial. The advisory committee was 
originally seen as a forum where the committee would provide candid advice to the 
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president/CEO of the hospital. It was expected that the committee would play a stronger role, 
given its membership, but it has become subservient to the president/CEO. By law, the 
president/CEO and his staff do not need to accommodate the committee’s demands nor heed 
its advice. The place of the advisory committee was defended by one of the mayors, who 
argued that, within the governance structure, the advisory committee is the only place where 
the two mayors sit together. This offers them opportunities to convey citizens’ demands to 
the hospital authority. Several committee members, including the mayor, expressed doubts 
that this committee has any meaningful vitality. The Mayors often advice the hospitals to 
keep the short waiting time and maintain good relationship with the local physicians for 
referrals. 
The role of the advisory committee was called into question during the first president’s term 
in office. Acting on serious concerns from employees and other stakeholders, including board 
members, on several occasions the mayors, through the advisory committee, sought to pass 
these concerns on to the president, with little success. Rather, the acrimonious relationship 
between the president and the mayors and other members continued to deteriorate. They 
decided to fire the first president in 2017. Nevertheless, the role of advisory committee 
remained the same as before. 
6.2 Cost and financial performance 
Cost management or reduction in public hospitals is a key aim of the reform. The new 
hospital with private sector style governance model was established to achieve the aim. The 
Mayor commented: ‘Financially, I set an upper limit of 10,000 JPY per citizen to give out to 
the new public hospital. They were also asked to serve the residents in both cities for 
emergency care and achieve patient satisfaction.’ The new hospital, formed as a corporation, 
has independence to run its affairs, although it depends entirely on the councils financially to 
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fund the deficit. Table 1 shows the profit and loss statements for the pre- and post-merger 
periods. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
In the post-merger period since 2013, financial performance has not improved and the deficit 
is still large. However, operational aspects such as the number of physicians and capital 
utilization rate are much higher in the new hospital (see Table 2). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
By 2015, the number of physicians had risen to 107 and the bed utility rate had increased to 
86.3 per cent. This is on a par with or better than the national average for similarly sized 
hospitals. The bed utility rate usually keeps the bottom line positive, but this has not 
happened in our case. The current CEO threw interesting light on his views on cost 
management and deficit reduction efforts. The CEO commented: ‘I feel burdened. To cover 
costs, we need to get more physicians … The payroll rate at this hospital is relatively high, at 
57 per cent, so we should have decreased it. But if so, it would cause a decrease in 
physicians.’ He went on to say: 
We need 30 more physicians. New physicians mean revenue is up. … If physicians are 
scarce, if physicians are tired from too much extra work, then they quit. First, we must invite 
more physicians to keep the minimum number of physicians, and then think about 
effectiveness. 
The approaches adopted by the current and previous CEOs are similar. There appeared to be 
a general understanding among our interviewees that recruiting more physicians is way to 
attract more patients, generate revenues and ensure quality of care. The new CEO aims to 
recruit 30 more physicians to take the number of physicians to 137. When we questioned 
whether the hospital would reach the saturation point in generating revenues, he answered 
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negatively. This is at odds with our calculations, since the national average for physicians is 
112 for a 500-bed hospital, and the new hospital already has 107. 
A similar discourse of preferring revenue generation over cost reduction was found in 
conversations with the hospital’s senior managers. One manager said: ‘cost matters are not 
discussed directly in internal management meetings.’ The management meeting involves the 
CEO, deputy directors and other departmental heads of the hospital. He further stated: ‘We 
do not emphasize cost itself. Moreover, we put emphasis on the number of patients, 
operations, length of hospital stay, from the point of view of revenue and profitability.’ This 
is partly because managers see no scope for reduction strategies, as argued by one manager: 
Of course, we pay much attention to cost. We always buy cheaper medicine and goods. We 
use nationwide benchmarks for price negotiations on medicine and goods. We search all 
over for the best price and negotiate with sellers to the bottom … We did do outsourcing, 
but we have a limit, so we must see revenues go up. This is a message from [the CEO]. 
Before the merger, the old hospitals suffered from a shortage of patients, so at first, we are 
focusing on getting more and more patients. 
 
Interestingly, the new hospital has reached almost 90 per cent occupancy, which is a 
relatively high capacity rate, so there is little room for revenue generation. This does not 
seem to be deterring the current CEO and his team from recruiting more physicians. On the 
point, one of the Mayors commented: The reason we established new hospital is to provide 
emergency cares to the citizen. So, as long as the hospital never refuses to accept emergency 
patients and absence of complains from citizen, we are happy with the hospital.  The Mayor 
of the city council wishes to keep the expenses under control but the most important criteria 
for them is hospitals offer good services to the citizens.  
6.3 Evaluation and reporting 
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Evaluation and periodic reporting to both the ministries are an essential part of the reform. 
These evaluations must be organized by the hospital, involving external stakeholders such as 
advisory committee members. In our case, the hospital asks the advisory committee to 
conduct evaluations. The evaluation seems to cover many aspects, such as operational and 
financial data, future plans, clinical functions, trials and future plans. However, it is 
questionable to what extent these evaluations are taken seriously. As one manager reported: 
‘Unnn. Would I say honestly? … Beforehand we prepare this evaluation, then circulate the 
evaluators and get their opinions.’ Our conversations with managers revealed that this is seen 
as a symbolic practice. The CEO was not even aware fully what’s on the report. 
The focus of the report is mainly to prepare a wish list. Evaluative aspects of the hospital are 
clearly missing from the reports. For instance, the reports from 2014 to 2017 never reflected 
on the circumstances under which the post of president had become untenable. The 
evaluation score was “A” overall, yet the CEO/president was asked to resign in 2017. The 
MIAC’s 2015 reform required hospitals to publish the report and submit it to the MIAC and 
city councils. Our interviews with a ministry official suggest that the ministry is not in a 
position to evaluate public hospitals’ reports. In fact, these reports do not seem to have any 
feedback system.  
7.0 Discussions  
To sum up, first, the intended governance structure in the new hospital has not emerged. The 
corporate assembly does not seem to be able to hold the hospital management to account. 
Second, absence of engagement with citizens is very noticeable. Third, cost management and 
reduction efforts are absent, and the focus on revenue generation continues. The deficit seems 
to be increasing rather than decreasing, and self-sustainability is still a distant target. Fourth, 
reporting and evaluation are symbolic. Reporting has become a vehicle for seeking more 
resources from city councils in the form of subsidies. Thus, the NPM-style agenda of reforms 
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is still far from reality. We have sought to understand why this is so. How do reform agendas 
interact with the Japanese way of doing things?  
Drawing on CPE, we have argued that we need to understand both cultural traditions and the 
historical and institutional context of the medical profession and education. We find that 
medical professionals, and especially physicians, are key actors in executing hospital reforms 
in Japan. The history of the medical profession indicates that the ikyoku system work as an 
internal labour markets is central to physicians’ careers and professional lives. Hospitals in 
small cities need to attract physicians who are embedded in the ikyoku system controlled by 
the medical schools. Similarly, physician themselves find the ikyoku system or being in 
senpai–kōhai useful for the advancement of their careers. Thus, it is natural for the two 
mayors to go to the regional medical school to persuade it to nominate a president/CEO and 
send more physicians to the hospital instead of attempting external labour markets.  
The ikyoku system plays, we find, both as enabling and constraining roles at the same time. 
Two mayors in our case hospital exploited the system in their favour, in some ways, to 
appoint CEOs. Without the ikyoku in place, it would have been much more difficult for them 
to attract experienced physicians. Subsequently, the appointed CEOs also played a strong role 
to attract other physicians to join the hospitals. Ikyoku is also constraining as the new 
hospitals have little opportunities to use the external labour markets. It is also difficult, as the 
ex-directors and the current CEO/COO commented, to have strong controls over physicians 
as they see their careers linked with the ikyoku instead of the hospitals they are working. 
Historically, Japanese medical education is based on creating experts in a particular field. 
They see themselves as part of a scientific research community, and the practical training 
they receive at the hospital is interspersed with scientific research. Any job opportunities at 
the university hospital even with lower salaries is perceived to be a far better option than the 
joining the ‘new clinical training system for physicians.’ Given the shortage of physicians, 
 24 
keeping physicians at the university hospitals, the ikyoku systems creates further constrains 
the supply of physicians for local public hospitals, a phenomenon that had a severe impact 
resulting in the closure of the old hospitals in the two-city council. This, in turn, creates panic 
among hospitals, who will do anything to keep the physicians in the hospital, strengthening 
the physicians’ power while raising payroll costs.  
We argue that medical schools’ power via the ikyoku system resides not only in the context of 
chronic shortages of physicians, but also arises from the respect afforded to physicians by 
wider society. This has implications for the hospital’s management and physician-patient 
relationships. NPM advocates private-sector governance in public-sector hospitals, which 
inevitably leads to the introduction of non-physician/professional managers in the hospital 
administration (Garman et al., 2010; Kirkpatrick et al., 2009) and should create space for 
accountability and transparency. This was not the case in Japan. Physicians remain the key 
actors in governance riding on the legal bindings that only medical professionals (dentists and 
physicians) can be the head of a hospital reflecting their status in Japanese society. We argue 
that this status and respect coupled with their careers being linked with ikyoku may have led 
to a lack of interest in engaging with citizens. 
At the same time, the aura and power of physicians create tensions in the corporate board, 
where corporate assembly members find it difficult to ask questions of the physician-cum-
CEO. The angry response from the then President reflected his awareness of his position in 
wider society and unwillingness to be questioned. The lack of strong voice of the city 
councils in the corporate board is also linked with the fact that ultimately the councils will be 
blamed for lack of medical services. They are also fully aware the fact the level of difficulty 
to attract physicians in the hospitals outside the big cities. 
The above structural/material conditions do not take away the role of Japanese cultural norms 
and values played in seeking accounts from the hospital management by the corporate board 
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members. The case in point the way two Mayors went about firing the previous president of 
the hospital.  They refused to fire the president directly. The desire of maintaining social 
order through wa is reflected in the whole process. This is also reflected in the board meeting 
monologues and the passive responses of council members. Silence or chinmoku is part and 
parcel of maintaining this harmony. No member wants to be the one who sticks out (deru kui 
wa utareru - sticks out gets hammered in), which prevents them from seeking accounts from 
others. The heated exchanges in the second corporate board meeting at the new hospital was 
the defining moment. Angry dialogues, direct verbal expressions, refusals, disagreements and 
defiance are avoided at all costs (Davies and Ikeno, 2002). Where people wish to identify 
themselves primarily as members of certain groups, not asking questions or keeping silence 
plays a very important role in creating harmony and avoiding conflict. According to Davies 
and Ikeno (2002, p.53), many people in Japan think that it is better to say nothing than to 
cause misunderstandings or trouble. 
Among the Japanese, social position, age and job status receive the highest consideration in 
social interactions such as board meetings (Davies and Ikeno, 2002). An explanation for this 
is given by Ishii and Bruneau (1994, p.250): 
Ideas and feelings that might hurt the other person or damage the general atmosphere when 
expressed are carefully sent back for reexamination in an internal self-feedback process. 
Only those ideas judged safe and vague are allowed to be sent out through the small exit that 
functions as a screen filter. This message screening process … is enryo (restraint); it makes 
the Japanese appear silent, vague, and awkward in communicating with superiors, strangers 
and people from different cultures. 
This desire to maintain wa or harmony and avoid seeking accounts may have contributed to 
the series of monologues rather than dialogues in formal board meetings at this hospital. We 
do not wish to claim that all Japanese public hospital governance exhibits exactly the same 
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feature, but the general patterns of interaction between and among key stakeholders in 
relation to accountability and the governance process are perhaps likely to be shaped by some 
form of verticality, monologues rather than dialogues, indirectness and silence. 
 
8.0 Concluding remarks 
The paper provides some explanations of why physicians may resist NPM ideals in 
healthcare complementing previous studies (Dahan, 2015; Turner et al., 2016; Andersen, 
2009). CPA approach guided us to examine both semiotic and extra semiotic features and 
their dialectical moments with key actors in assessing the limits of NPMs in non-Western 
contexts. In doing so, it contributes to debate on the role of healthcare professionals in 
reforms in light of broader socio-cultural, historical and institutional contexts (Martinussen 
and Magnussen, 2011). We argue that the social embededness of physicians is an improtnat 
factor to consider. For instance, the power and constraints of physicians cannot be fully 
understood without invoking the concept of the ikyoku system and the historical power 
position of physicians in Japanese society. At the same time, the evolution of the ikyoku 
system, despite originating from Germany, has been shaped by cultural norms such as the 
senpai–kōhai relationship. Thus, both cultural norms and historical and institutional contexts 
provide us with some sense of the unanticipated consequences of Western-centric NPM 
ideals in Japanese hospitals. 
The paper also contributes to a critique of the unquestioning adoption of NPM styles of 
governance without considering the local context. Researchers have already highlighted the 
unanticipated consequences of unmodified adoptions of NPM reforms. It might be argued 
that, in Japan, economic and political certainties are relatively similar to Western countries, 
yet the institutional context, historical legacy and cultural attributes are far from similar. 
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Although Japan has a strong tradition of borrowing rich cultures, religions, philosophies and 
technologies, it has also been through a process of iitoko-dori, or adaptation rather than 
adoption (Davies and Ikeno, 2002). Appreciation of these conditions is key to a better 
understanding of the (un)intended consequences of healthcare reforms in Japan and 
worldwide. 
Finally, the paper has practical implications as it provides some explanations of how, for 
instance, key social actors interact with the healthcare reforms. Theoretically, we are arguing 
identifying these cultural and historical conditions will provide healthcare policy makers with 
a better understanding of unintended consequences and perhaps possible remedies. Health 
care professionals such as physicians in Japan do not appear to engage with the cost 
management ideals as perceived by policy makers. Healthcare bodies need to engage with 
medical and business schools to popularize the cost management reform agenda. The findings 
suggest that reforms may be less controversial if their dynamics arise from the healthcare 
professionals themselves rather than being imposed upon them.  
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